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Abstract: To more thoroughly study the effect of ownership on management turnover, 
firms are classified by ownership simultaneously along two dimensions: types of owners 
and concentration of ownership.  Under this new framework, a unique data set is used to 
study the sensitivity of management turnover to a company’s performance.  The study 
confirms some of the results from previous studies.  It also obtained interesting and 
important new results.  It finds evidence that the sensitivity of management turnover to 
performance is curvilinear in ownership concentration, but in opposite directions under 
state and private ownership.  It also provides evidence allowing us to rank firms in 
different categories of ownership by their sensitivity of management turnover to 
performance: Concentrated private ownership has the highest sensitivity, concentrated 
state ownership the lowest, and the two categories of dispersed ownership, one with a 
private investor and the other with the state as the largest shareholder, in between.  




The purpose of this paper is to more thoroughly study the effect of ownership on 
management turnover.  To facilitate the study, it adopts a new framework and a unique 
data set of China’s listed companies.   
Many authors have recognized the importance of ownership to managerial 
discipline and studied separately the effect of state and that of concentrated ownership on 
management turnover.  A distinctive feature of our study is that it classifies all firms 
simultaneously along two dimensions of ownership, i.e., state vis-à-vis private ownership 
(the “who” or “type” dimension) and that of concentrated vis-à-vis dispersed ownership 
(the “how much” dimension).  This creates a two-by-two framework allowing us to study 
some traditional questions of interest from new angles and also new questions that have 
not been studied before, as we will further explain soon.  
More precisely, in the two-by-two framework, the four categories of firms are 
defined as follows (refer to Figure 1).   
1) The category Large State consists of firms in which the state is the largest 
owner and ownership is concentrated.  Note that private ownership may or may not exist 
in these firms.  When it does not exist in a firm in this category, the firm has a hundred 
percent state ownership as in a traditional SOE.  
2) The category Large Private consists of firms in which a private investor is the 
largest owner and ownership is concentrated.  Note that state ownership may or may not 
exist in these firms.  When it does not exist in a firm in this category, the firm is a 
traditional capitalist firm.  
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3) The category Small State consists of firms in which the state is the largest 
owner, but the absolute size of state ownership is small.   
4) The category Small Private consists of firms in which a private investor is the 
largest owner and ownership is dispersed.   
In such a new and more general framework, we can study the effect of state 
ownership by comparing firms in categories 1 and 3 with those in categories 2 and 4, 
study the effect of concentrated ownership by comparing firms in categories 1 and 2 with 
those in categories 3 and 4, study the effect of concentrated ownership with a distinction 
made between the cases where the largest owner is the state and those where it is a 
private investor by comparing firms in categories 1 and 2, and study the effect of diluted 
state ownership with private ownership by comparing firms in categories 1 and 3.   
In the literature studying the importance of ownership to corporate governance, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) are among the first to call our attention to the positive role of 
concentrated ownership in monitoring management.  Johnson et al (2000), however, point 
out the problem of “tunneling”, i.e., “the transfer of resources out of a company to its 
controlling shareholder”.  Bebchuk (1999) develops a “rent-protection” theory of large 
shareholder’s lock on control to seek for private benefit. 
Much effort has been made to empirically test these theories.  Morck et al. (1988) 
find an inverse U-shaped relationship of corporate performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, 
to concentrated ownership, i.e., performance first improves with ownership concentration 
and then declines.  Gorton and Schmid (2000) find that block holding by banks improves 
German firms’ performance.  Kaplan (1994a) and Franks and Mayer (2001) find that 
management turnover is related to corporate performance rather than concentration of 
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ownership.  However, Denis et al (1997) find that outside blockholder do enhance the 
sensitivity of executive turnover to performance in US companies, while managerial 
shareholding weakens it.  Kaplan (1994b) finds that concentrated ownership and closer 
monitoring in Japanese firms lead to less incentive pay received by Japanese managers 
than by their American counterparts.  Yafeh and Yosha (2003) find that concentrated 
ownership reduces managerial expenditure for private benefit in Japanese firms.  Volpin 
(2002) finds a low sensitivity of turnover to performance in Italy when the control is fully 
in the hand of one large shareholder and not shared by a group of core shareholders and 
when the controlling shareholders are also top executives.   
A common feature of these studies is that they use data of capitalist firms to study 
the effect of ownership from the angle of “how much”, but not “who”.  Our study 
confirms some of the results of these previous studies.  For example, it finds an inversely 
U-shaped relationship between performance and turnover as ownership concentration 
increases when the largest shareholder is a private investor, which is similar to the 
concentration-performance relationship found by Morck et al (1988).  Beyond that and 
taking advantage of the two-by-two framework, we further find that, when the state is the 
largest and concentrated shareholder, turnover sensitivity to performance is significantly 
lower.  Furthermore, it turns out that the turnover sensitivity is also curvilinear in state 
ownership concentration, although in an opposite direction to that found in private firms.  
Empirical study of the impact of state ownership on the performance-turnover 
relationship is relatively scarce.  One of the earlier influential studies was by Groves et al. 
(1995), which finds that new reform measures introduced in the 1980s did lead to 
increased managerial turnover in response to poor performance in SOEs in China.   
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Comparing corporate governance and performance of traditional SOEs with those that 
have been incorporated, Aivazian et al (2005) find that management turnover is more 
sensitive to performance in the latter than in the former group of firms.  Most recently, 
Firth et al. (2006) and Kato and Long (2006) find a negative effect of state ownership on 
the sensitivity of management turnover to performance in China’s listed companies.   
A common feature of these studies is that they focus on the question of “who”, 
but not that of “how much”, in ownership.1  Our study confirms the finding that the link 
between management turnover and firm performance is weaker in state-controlled than 
privately controlled companies regardless of the size of state ownership.  Beyond that, we 
further find that, as mentioned before, the size of state ownership matters.  Dispersed 
ownership helps to increase the sensitivity of management turnover to performance when 
the state remains the largest shareholder.   
Evidence from the study allows us to rank the four categories of companies in a 
descending order of sensitivity of management turnover to performance: Large Private, 
Small Private, Small State and Large State.  Taking together, these findings suggest that, 
on the one hand, ownership reforms such as diluting state ownership or making the state a 
minority shareholder, do contribute to improved governance in SOEs so that these 
activities should be encouraged.  On the other hand, it is doubtful that firms with an 
ownership structure in favor of state can be as effective in disciplining management as 
their counterparts with an ownership structure in favor of private investors.  
The results and insights obtained from our study not only contribute greatly to the 
literature studying the impact of ownership on the sensitivity of management turnover to 
                                                 
1 An exception is Kato and Long (2006), who include shares of the largest owner in a listed 
company in their model.  But, they do not distinguish who the largest shareholder is.  As we will 
show, the size effect is very different when the largest owner is the state as opposed to private.  
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performance but also have great practical significance.  It is worthwhile to observe that 
most economies in today’s world have significant state ownership in some important 
sectors.  However, these days, state ownership is more likely to take a new and flexible 
form.  China is a major example of incorporating traditional SOEs with the state as either 
a majority or a minority owner in the new companies.  Incorporation of SOEs has also 
happened in Australia under the policy of New Public Management (Wettenhall, 2001).  
Some scholars, prominently Bardham and Roemer (1992), believe that dominance of 
state ownership in new and flexible forms is a viable and necessary foundation for an 
efficient and equitable economy.  Our study casts doubt on this belief.  
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 summarizes China’s 
experience in the SOE reform to provide the institutional background for this study.  
Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 presents descriptive statistics of ownership, 
performance and executive turnover.   Section 5 presents the regression results.  Section 6 
discusses the policy implications of our findings.  Section 7 summarizes the paper.  
 
2. State enterprise reform in China. 
China started to reform its SOEs in the late 1970's when economic reform was 
incepted.  In the 1980s, the effort focused mainly on providing better incentives to SOE 
managers (see Groves et al, 1995; and Groves 1994).  In the 1990s, to deepen the reform, 
a greater effort is made to restructure governance in SOEs.  One of the most important 
measures in this regard is the enactment of Company Law in 1993.  The Law was later 
amended three times, most recently in 2005.  The Company Law grants SOE managers 
the right to run an SOE without governmental interference.  It also encourages SOEs to 
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incorporate so that they can have a formal governance structure similar to that in modern 
corporations in the west.  Since then, many SOEs, including many of the largest and most 
important ones, have been incorporated and listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.  The effort of incorporation over more than a decade’s time has turned China 
into the eighth largest stock market in the world with more than 1300 listed companies 
and a total of issued capital over $90 billion by May 2006.2  The continuous reform effort 
and measures introduced in both the 1980s and the 1990s injected strong momentum into 
many SOEs, speeding up their growth.  By one measure, the total fixed assets of China’s 
state enterprises grew from RMB 345 billion yuan in 1980 to 2009 billion yuan in 2003,3 
although during the same time period the share of the state sector in GDP declined from 
76 percent to 35 percent.4   
It is critical to understand that incorporation is not equivalent to privatization and 
rapid growth is not equivalent to high efficiency.  When an SOE is being incorporated, 
the government may allow it to sell partial ownership to private investors.5  But, the state 
typically maintains a significant, likely a dominant ownership stake in the firm.  This way, 
the state can maintain its control over the firm.  The figures in Table 1 show that, in 2005, 
83 percent of China’s listed companies had a share block exceeding 25 percent of 
ownership, and one third of them exceeding 50 percent.  These figures suggest that, in 
terms of ownership concentration, listed companies in China are more similar to their 
                                                 
2 The data can be found at the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges websites. 
3 Data source: China Statistics Yearbook, 1981, p. 260, and 2004, pp. 534-536.  Data of both 
years are deflated to the 1978 constant RMB value using Retail Price Index (RPI).   RPI is 
reported in China Statistics Yearbook 2004, Table 9-2. 
4 Data source: the total output value for state and nonstate sectors are reported in China Statistics 
Yearbook, 1981, p. 53, and 2004, p. 208. Based on these data, the share of state sector in 
economy is calculated for the two years.  
5 Li, Wu and Li (2004) call this phenomenon of partial privatization of China’s SOEs as 
“privatization in the margin”.   
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German and Japanese counterparts, with shares often concentrated in the hands of large 
block holders, whereas in the United States shares are usually more diversely held.  The 
difference is that, in China, the block shareholder is typically the state, whereas in 
Germany and Japan, they are typically institutions, e.g., banks, families or other 
companies.  The numbers in the parentheses in Table 1 show the percentage of listed 
companies where the state is the largest shareholder among the companies with a share 
block exceeding, respectively, 25, 50, and 75 percent.  As can be seen from these 
numbers, the government is the largest shareholder in most of China’s listed companies.  
All listed companies in China have a similar organizational structure of corporate 
governance, no matter who owns the company, since these companies are subject to the 
same set of laws.  The structure consists of the shareholders’ assembly, the board of 
directors, and the management.  By the Company Law, the term of a director is no more 
than three years.  But a director may serve consecutive terms if reelected.  The board of 
directors is composed of five to nineteen members.  The board may appoint or dismiss 
the chief executive officer (CEO) and decide his or her compensation.  The CEO is 
directly responsible to the board.  CEO may recommend to the board vice presidents and 
other senior executives.  Thus, in China’s listed companies, CEO is placed above other 
managers in the managerial hierarchy.  In this respective, Chinese companies are similar 
to US companies where CEO has a greater power in corporate issues than other 
executives.  In contrast, German companies have two boards: the board of directors and 
the management board.  The entire management board is responsible for daily operation 
of a company, while CEO does not have much more authority than other managers in the 
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board.  Recognizing this difference, we follow those studying US companies to examine 
the turnover of the CEO, rather than that of the management board.  
Pertaining to state companies, a government agency known as the “State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council” (SASAC) 
represents the state to perform the right of ownership.  SASAC was first established in 
2003 by the State Council to supervise central government-owned enterprises.  Provincial 
SASACs have also been formed to supervise state enterprises controlled by provincial 
governments.  SASAC’s designated mission is to maximize the value of state assets.  It is 
the bureaucrats in this agency who nominate directors representing the state, decide their 
compensation and influence the company’s strategic decisions.6  In firms where the state 
is the largest shareholder, through the state directors on the board, through SASAC, the 
government basically appoints CEOs.  Considering the different objectives of 
government and its bureaucrats on the one side and private investors and their agents on 
the other side, one can expect different patterns of personnel appointments in SOEs than 
in private firms.   
 
3. Data and Variables 
The data we use in the study are from China’s two stock exchanges: Shenzhen 
and Shanghai.  They are ideal for the purpose of our study as China’s strategy to reform 
its inefficient SOEs is like a controlled experiment.  The essence of this strategy is to 
avoid massive privatization, instead try to make SOEs more efficient by introducing 
managerial incentives, incorporating them and mimicking the governance structure of 
                                                 
6 The central government SASAC’s website is www.sasac.gov.cn. The website shows personnel 
changes in state enterprises directly under the supervision of SASAC. 
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publicly traded companies in mature market economies in the west.  While overall a 
significant level of state ownership in the economy is maintained, especially in sectors 
deemed critical for national interests, investment by foreign or domestic private investors 
of various sizes are allowed in SOEs.  This has transformed China into an economy in 
which firms with exclusive state ownership, exclusive private ownership and those with 
mixed state and private ownership, coexist side by side and each counts for a significant 
portion of the economy.  Furthermore, the governance structure of all listed companies 
with different ownership types is comparable due to the legal requirements imposed by 
the government and its supervisory agency Chinese Security Regulation Committee 
(CSRC).  Thus, observed differences in executive turnover are more directly attributable 
to ownership than to specific features of corporate governance.  
The data from Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange provide 
complete information of a company from the year it becomes listed to the year it is 
delisted, or year 2005 which is the most recent year of available data.  Thus, the dataset is 
an unbalanced panel, consisting of, on average, five years’ data of 1500 companies.  For 
an individual company, the number of years listed ranges from 1 to 16 years.  A 
company’s financial performance variables are abundant including total sales, total assets, 
profit before taxes, return to assets and annual return to stock.   
There are two measures of executive turnover:  the turnover of board directors 
and that of CEO.  Director turnover is measured by the percentage of directors who had 
an involuntary turnover in a year, i.e., who left the board for reasons other than illness, 
retirement, death or quitting as of the total number of directors at the beginning of the 
year.  We consider leaving the board at the completion of a term also as involuntary 
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turnover because, according to the Company Law, directors can be re-elected.  If a 
director is not re-elected, there can only be one reason: the supervising government 
authority does not want him or her to be re-elected. CEO turnover equals one if the CEO 
of a company left involuntarily and is zero otherwise.  We exclude voluntary turnover 
because it does not reflect corporate control.  However, some voluntary turnover may be 
in fact involuntary.  With the hint from the board, poorly performing executives may 
choose to resign to avoid embarrassment.  By excluding all voluntary turnovers, we may 
underestimate the extent of truly involuntary turnover.  
 The data set has three variables pertaining to ownership: the largest owner of a 
company, the percentage of shares owned by the largest owner, and the total percentage 
of shares owned by different kinds of owners.  Based on the nature and shares of the 
largest owner, we create four dummy variables: (1) companies with a large ownership 
stake controlled by the state, i.e. the large ownership=1 and the largest owner=the state; 
(2) the large ownership controlled by a nonstate investor, i.e. the large ownership=1 and 
the largest owner=nonstate; (3) dispersed shareholding with the state as the largest 
shareholder, i.e. the large ownership=0 and the largest owner=state; (4) dispersed 
shareholding with a nonstate investor as the largest shareholder, i.e. the large 
ownership=0 and the largest owner=nonstate. 7  Different cut-off levels are used to define 
the large shareholding, specifically 50%, 33%, and 25%.  Table 2 shows the composition 
of four kinds of companies under different definitions of large ownership.  As can be seen 
                                                 
7 In China, state shares take two forms: shares directly owned by SASAC or different levels of 
government (CSRC names these shares “state shares.”), and state legal entity shares (invested by 
SOEs.)  There is some difference between these two kinds of shareholders as listed companies 
controlled by the state legal entity were said to have more autonomy than those controlled 
directly by the government.  However, typically, these kinds of shareholders are grouped together 
and known as state shares.  In our definitions of large or small state ownership, we use the state 
share definition in the general sense and include both types of owners, government and SOEs.  
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there, roughly seventy percent of companies have the largest shareholder being the state.  
Among them, half have the state ownership exceeding 50 percent.  
 Over time, state ownership may be reduced and sold to private investors.  If this 
kind of switch is triggered by performance, the classification of a company by ownership 
into one of the four categories would be endogenous.  An examination of the data reveals 
that moving across categories is not frequent.  Of 12549 company-year observations, only 
1.82 percent or 228 observations had moved from the category of Large State to that of 
Small State, which is the most common kind of move.  The second most frequent move is 
from Small State to Small Private.  Hence, generally speaking, the listed companies are 
quite stable in their belonged categories.   
 
4. Ownership, Performance and Turnover 
In this section, we provide some initial evidence of performance and executive 
turnover of the four groups of companies.  Regardless of the measure used, companies 
with large state shareholding have the best financial performance, followed by large 
private shareholding, small state and small private.  State companies especially those with 
a large state shareholding also have larger assets.  Despite good performance, companies 
with large state shareholding have a higher director and CEO turnover rate than those 
with large private shareholding.8  CEOs in the four groups of companies have similar 
                                                 
8 The CEO turnover rate we calculated is lower than Firth et al (2006) and Kato and Long (2006). 
Kato and Long documented an average of 24 percent of CEO turnover.  Firth et al obtained the 
estimate of about 45 percent turnover of chairmen of the board and 20 percent was “forced.”  We 
use a much longer panel of data than these two studies.  In earlier years, executive turnover was 
less common.  Also, we use more restrictive definition of involuntary turnover.  Both factors lead 
to a lower estimated turnover rate. 
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characteristics.  However, CEOs in state companies tend to be slightly older, more likely 
to be a party member and less likely to have a post-college education.  
 Better performance of companies with large state shareholding may not be due to 
better management, but rather to monopoly status or other advantages granted by the 
government.  If state companies’ good performance is not really due to good management, 
then a high turnover rate of their executives would be reasonable.  To examine how much 
the good performance of state companies is due to good management and how much due 
to monopoly power and governmental preferential treatment, we demonstrate industry 
distribution of the four kinds of companies and compute the average profit of each kind 
given a specific industry.  
 As shown in Table 4, companies with large state ownership are more likely to be 
in mining and utility industries that are generally considered as being monopolistic and 
have a higher profit level.  On the other hand, large state companies are also likely to be 
in quite competitive industries such as manufacturing.  Within an industry, except in 
utility, information technology, real estate and service, large state companies tend to have 
a better performance than other kinds of companies.  Although large state companies’ 
better performance in a competitive industry may be partially attributable to factors such 
as lower borrowing cost and better market access, it seems difficult to completely rule out 
the importance of management.9 
 
5. Regression Results  
                                                 
9 In a separate paper, we study the lagged performance after executive turnover in large state 
companies and find evidence of worse performance after a CEO turnover.  The finding supports 
the argument that performance in these companies is at least partially attributable to management.   
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In the regression model, we use Large_State, Large_Nonstate, Small_State to 
denote, respectively, company groups (1), (2), and (3) above.  Group (4), which consists 
of companies with diverse shareholding and the largest shareholder being private, is used 




Turnover = Large_State+ Large_Private+ Small_State
                     Large_State * Performance Large_Private * Performance
                     + Small_State * Performance + Small_Private * Perfo







                    Industry τ Year                                                          (1)i
i j
iXκ ς ε+ + + +∑ ∑
In 
the model, Turnover denotes director or CEO turnover and Performance the company’s 
one-year lag pre-tax profit.  Explanatory variables include dummy variables of the three 
company groups and the interaction of the four group dummies with performance.  Our 
main interest is in the coefficient estimates of the four interaction variables.  They 
suggest how executive turnover changes with the company’s performance in the four 
kinds of companies.  The estimates are generally expected to have a negative sign, 
suggesting reduced executive turnover with better performance.  However, the size of the 
estimates may differ across groups.   F-tests are conducted to test whether or not these 
estimates are significantly different across groups.  Control variables in the model include 
the sizes of the companies and industries to which they belong, with size approximated 
by sale volumes and industries given by the Standard Classification of Industries by 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).  Year dummies are also included to 
control for all time-specific factors such as business cycle. In the CEO turnover 
estimation, CEO’s personal characteristics such as age, gender, party membership, 
education attainment, and job tenure, are also included as additional control variables. 
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 In another variation, the model is specified as follows: 
The main feature of model 2 is to include sharepct to measure continuous changes in 
shareholding.  The value of sharepct equals the percentage of shares held by the largest 
owner in a company.  To allow the curvilinear effect of ownership concentration on 
management turnover, we also include the squared term, sharepct2.  To distinguish state 
and private block holdings, State_ Sharepct is used to indicate the share percentage held 
by the largest shareholder where the largest shareholder is state.  Nonstate_Sharepct is 
used for the share percentage held by the largest shareholder where the largest 
shareholder is nonstate.  The interaction of State_Sharepct and Nonstate_Sharepct with 
performance shows the impact of increased ownership concentration on executive 
turnover when the largest shareholder is, respectively, the state and nonstate.  The 
interaction between state_ or nonstate_sharepct2 and performance captures the 
curvilinear effect of ownership concentration on executive turnover when performance 
improves.   
To control for firm-specific factors affecting executive turnover, we utilize the 
panel data to estimate the fixed effect specification of the above models.  The cross-
sectional model is estimated with both within- and across-company variation.  The effect 
of performance on executive turnover is identified by comparing turnover in two 
companies with different performance as well as turnover in the same company in 
different years.  In contrast, only the within-company variation is used to estimate the 
Turnover = Performance+ State_Sharepct State_Sharepct2
                                   Nonstate_Sharepct Nonstate_Sharepct2
                                    + State_Sharepct*Performance Sta








                                   Nonstate_Sharepct*Performance Nonstate_Sharepct2*Performance
                                    + X Industry Year             i i j
i j
ρ ξ
κ ς τ ε
+ +
+ + +∑ ∑                         (2)
 16
fixed effect model.  The effect of performance on turnover is identified by variation in 
turnover in the same company in different years.  Year dummy variables are excluded 
from the fixed effect estimations.  
Tables 5 through 7 document the estimates of model 1 with the cut-off level for 
large ownership set at 50%, 33%, and 25% respectively.  In these tables, the effects of 
state ownership conditional on different levels of share concentration are compared.  In 
general, state large shareholding is associated with less sensitive executive turnover to 
performance than private large shareholding regardless of the cutoff level used to define 
large shareholding; small state ownership has a weaker performance-turnover link than 
small private ownership.  In some cases, due to the limited number of observations in 
those groups (e.g. the number of state or private companies that has a large shareholder 
holding 50% or more shares is small), the effect is not statistically significant.  
In Table 8, we show the effect of state vis-à-vis private ownership on executive 
turnover allowing for continuous effect of concentrated ownership.  The results show that 
shareholding concentration has a different impact on the performance-turnover sensitivity 
under the state and private ownership.  Under the private ownership, the presence of 
private blockholding enhanced the performance-turnover link and the effect was 
curvilinear, suggesting an inverse U-shaped relationship between control effectiveness 
and the private ownership concentration.  This result is consistent with Morck et al 
(1988).  Under state ownership, ownership concentration leads to less sensitive CEO 
turnover to performance.  The results pertaining to the director turnover are somewhat 
ambiguous.  
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We have also estimated equations (1) and (2) using a slightly different definition 
of state shareholding.  Instead of letting the state ownership equal to one if the largest 
shareholder is the state, we let the state ownership equal to one if there is any state share 
in a company, i.e. when it is greater than zero.  Similarly, by interacting with large or 
small shareholding, we create the four group dummies, large state ownership, large 
private, small state and small private.  The estimation results are reported in the tables in 
the Appendix, Table A1 to Table A3.  The pattern of results is similar to what we 
reported in Tables 5, 6 and 7.   
So far, all the estimations are conducted using one-year lag pre-tax profit as the 
measure of company’s performance.  To check the robustness of the results, we also 
estimate the model with two- and three-year lag pre-tax profit and other performance 
variables such as annual return to stock and return to assets.  The results are similar to 
those that have been reported in the paper. 10 
 
6. Policy implications 
The results of this study have clear and important policy implications.  With 
regard to private ownership, our study suggests that concentrated ownership is positive 
for managerial discipline, as found in existing literature.  With regard to state ownership, 
our study suggests that, when the state remains the largest owner in a firm, more scattered 
ownership can help discipline managers.  It is even better if the state gives up being the 
largest owner, or completely withdraws its ownership from a firm.  These findings are 
consistent with previous findings that the reform efforts have had a positive efficiency 
effect on China’s SOEs.  But they also suggest that the positive effect is not a reason for 
                                                 
10 For brevity, these results are not reported in the paper. They are available upon request.  
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complacency or against privatization, since firms with state ownership do not have as 
sensitive a link between executive turnover and performance as private firms.  These 
findings do not support the view of Bardham and Roemer (1992) that, while improving 
efficiency, state ownership can be as efficient as private ownership.  Neither do they 
support the view that in transition to a market economy, privatization is thus not 
necessary because measures to improve incentives and corporate governance are 
adequate for SOEs to achieve the highest efficiency.11 
At a deeper level, Laffont and Tirole (1993) have raised the question why SOEs 
cannot replicate incentives in private firms for managers and thereby become as efficient.  
Our study finds that state ownership has a significant effect on management turnover.  
Since executive appointments in SOEs are made by politicians, our findings suggest the 
importance of scrutinizing politicians’ incentives to solve this puzzle. 
It might be argued that the turnover-performance link is weaker in SOEs because 
the state (politicians) wants to use “high turnover” as a pressure for managers to work 
harder, as a reward for good managers (i.e., by promoting them up and away), or as a way 
to more promptly reallocate competent managers to poorly performing companies in 
hope of turning the companies around.  It is theoretically also possible that the proven 
competent SOE managers are rewarded with better market opportunities.  In any of these 
situations, empirically, we would find a weakened turnover-performance link in SOEs. 
Alternatively, the weak turnover-performance link could be explained by the 
grabbing hand theory of politicians proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1994, 1999) and 
Frye and Shleifer (1997).  The essence of this explanation is that politicians prefer to 
                                                 
11 For example, see President Jiang Zemin’s Report to the 15th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, September 12, 1997.  
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appoint their confidants to key executive positions so that they can more conveniently 
enjoy some private benefits.  Since a confidant in a more profitable company is likely to 
bring more private benefit, such a company is a place of more political wrestling for 
executive appointments, weakening the link between turnover and performance and 
thereby hurting efficiency.   
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully discuss and empirically test these 
competing explanations of the effect of state ownership on the sensitivity of management 
turnover to performance.  Casual observations suggest that, in China’s SOEs, executives 
at very “fat” positions are more likely to be either “promoted” to less enviable positions 
or prosecuted for economic crimes.  The frequent occurrence of the latter events has 
caused major discussions in Chinese media (government controlled or not) and calls for a 
better protection of successful entrepreneurs in the state sector.  These observations are 
consistent with the explanation of the weak link of executive turnover with performance 
by the grabbing-hand theory.  We also observe that, due to an immature market for 
business executives, it has been rare for executives of China’s major SOEs to leave their 
current positions for better market opportunities.  While far from being conclusive, these 
observations do not support the view that a weak link between turnover and performance 
is explainable by an efficiency-enhancing reward system.12  In a separate paper, we study 
the implications of executive turnover for performance in SOEs.  We find evidence that 
an executive turnover leads to the statistically significant poorer performance in an SOE.  
                                                 
12 If anything, a move in the opposite direction, i.e., from a governmental position to a fat 
managerial position, seems to be considered by many as a reward.  China’s largest economic 
center the municipal of Shanghai seems to have an implicit policy of rewarding loyal party 
members by appointing them to fat managerial positions in the last years before retirement. 
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This cast further doubt on the argument that politicians are using high turnovers as a 
measure to promote better managerial effort and efficiency.  
 
7. Summary 
Adopting a new and more general framework and using a unique data set, we 
have more thoroughly examined the effect of state vis-a-vis private ownership and 
concentrated vis-à-vis dispersed ownership on the sensitivity of executive turnover to a 
company’s performance.  The study has produced consistent and convincing evidence 
that the sensitivity in question depends on both who the owner is and how concentrated 
ownership is.  Compared with those dominated by private ownership, three distinctive 
features of management turnover in companies with significant state ownership emerged.  
First, it is generally higher.  Second, it is less sensitive to performance.  And third, its 
sensitivity to performance further declines as ownership becomes more concentrated, 
while the opposite is true in private firms as found in both this and previous studies. 
Our findings have the policy implication that a certain degree of concentration is 
beneficial for efficiency in private firms.  They also suggest that reform measures such as 
diluting state ownership or the state yielding the largest shareholding position are helpful, 
but not adequate for improving efficiency in SOEs.  These findings are reasons for 
skepticism that SOEs can ever replicate private incentives for managers, as those 
responsible for executive appointments might have motivations other than best efficiency 
in SOEs.  Justification for maintaining the state ownership in a transitional economy thus 
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Table 1: Concentration of Ownership and Sate Ownership 
Year1 
Number of Listed 
Companies 
Proportion of  
Companies with a 






Companies with a 






Companies with a 





1993 219 75.8 (70.48) 35.16 (74.03) 2.74 (100.00) 
1994 345 81.45 (73.67) 40.58 (74.29) 6.09 (80.95) 
1995 381 83.46 (75.16) 40.94 (81.41) 4.99 (94.74) 
1996 599 85.31 (76.91) 41.4 (81.85) 4.01 (95.83) 
1997 821 85.87 (80.43) 44.21 (84.57) 4.26 (97.14) 
1998 931 87.33 (79.46) 45.33 (84.83) 4.73 (95.45) 
1999 1031 88.07 (78.52) 45.59 (85.96) 4.85 (96.00) 
2000 1193 87.43 (78.81) 45.43 (86.35) 4.61 (92.73) 
2001 1256 86.23 (78.39) 43.79 (86.36) 3.98 (90.00) 
2002 1327 86.44 (74.89) 42.5 (84.93) 3.84 (94.12) 
2003 1388 84.51 (70.08) 40.13 (80.43) 3.39 (91.49) 
2004 1487 82.58 (66.61) 38.6 (78.22) 4.17 (90.32) 
2005 1476 82.52 (63.14) 34.55 (73.73) 1.29 (89.47) 
 
Notes:  
1. Due to the limited number of companies, summary statistics prior to 1993 were not reported.   
2. In parenthesis is the percentage of companies with the state being the largest shareholder among those that have a large share block of at least 
25, 50, or 75%.
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Table 2: Distribution of four groups of companies 
 Percentage  Percentage  Percentage
Large1 State4 
Ownership 
34.00 Large2 State 
Ownership 
53.06 Large3 State 
Ownership 
62.48 
Large1 Private 7.91 Large2 Private 15.24 Large3 Private 22.78 
Small1 State 35.30 Small2 State 16.24 Small3 State 6.83 
Small1 Private 22.79 Small2 Private 15.45 Small3 Private 7.91 
Number of 
observations =125495 
100%  100%  100% 
 
Note: 
1. Large1 or small1 indicates whether the company has a large shareholder holding 50% or more shares. 
2. Large2 or small2 indicates whether the company has a large shareholder holding 33% or more shares. 
3. Large3 or small3 indicates whether the company has a large shareholder holding 25% or more shares. 
4. State or private indicates whether the largest shareholder is the state or private.  
5. The total number of company-year observations is 12549. 
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Table 3: Performance and executive turnover of four groups of companies 




Small State1 Small Private1 
 Performance     
Sales2  2.10 1.43 0.84 0.85 
Asset2 2.83 2.39 2.34 2.20 
Pre-tax profit2  0.18 0.11 0.06 0.05 
Return to Asset 0.044 0.029 0.024 -0.02 
Average Yearly Return to Stock 0.068 0.060 0.048  0.01 
 Executive turnover     
Average board of director turnover3 0.023 0.018 0.026 0.033 
CEO turnover4  0.10 0.04 0.10 0.10 
 CEO Characteristics      
CEO age  47.60 45.80 47.58 45.14 
CEO female 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
CEO communist party member 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.24 
CEO having more than college degree 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.30 
CEO having college degree 0.78 0.72 0.76 0.67 
CEO having high school degree 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
CEO having less than high school 
degree 
0.001 0.002 0.01 0.004 
 
Note: 
1. Large or small indicates whether the company has a large shareholder holding 50% or more shares. State or private indicates whether the largest 
shareholder is the state or private.  
2. Sales, asset, and pre-tax profit are in RMB billion Yuan (1 billion Yuan is equivalent to 130 million dollars). 
3. Director turnover indicates on average the percentage of directors being displaced a year in a board.  
4. CEO turnover indicates the percentage of companies with CEO being displaced in a year. 
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Table 4: Industry Distribution and Performance 
 
Note:  
1. Large or small indicates whether the company has a large shareholder holding 50% or more shares; State or private indicates whether the largest 
shareholder is the state or private.  
2. Industry dummies are created based on China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) Industry classification system. It indicates the company’s major 
industry. “Diverse” indicates that the company operates in diverse industries.  
3. In parenthesis is the average pre-tax profit for each group of companies in the corresponding industry. The last column shows the average profit for each 
industry including all groups of companies. Pre-tax profit is in RMB billion Yuan (1 billion Yuan is equivalent to 130 million dollars). 
4. The number is missing because there is only one company belonging to that cell.  




















Agriculture 1.78  (0.066)3 1.72  (0.023) 2.53  (0.016) 2.31  (0.017) 0.031 
Mining 2.02  (1.793) 2.12  (0.084) 0.75  (0.097) 0.42  (0.258) 1.101   
Manufacturing 65.62  (0.139) 58.53 (0.078) 48.98 (0.040) 51.68  (0.054) 0.087  
Utility 4.52  (0.489) 2.02 (0.901) 4.84 (0.133) 2.13  (0.158) 0.309  
Construction 2.51 (0.084) 2.22  (-0.025) 0.84  (0.036) 1.26  (0.051) 0.059   
Transportation, storage 4.31  (0.249) 4.34  (0.157) 3.73  (0.091) 3.29 (0.077) 0.155  
Information technology 4.27  (0.127) 6.96  (0.339) 5.17 (0.048) 9.34  (0.001) 0.080  
Wholesale and retail 5.72  (0.056) 6.05 (-0.015) 13.51  (0.036) 4.62  (0.007) 0.035 
Finance and insurance 0.02  (.)4 0.2  (0.150) 1.33  (0.713) 0.98  (0.544) 0.657  
Real estate 3.05  (0.138) 6.26 (0.158) 4.13  (0.077) 5.31  (0.064) 0.099  
Services 2.74  (0.126) 0.71  (0.191) 4.47  (0.048) 3.6  (0.045) 0.071  
Median and entertainment 0.94  (0.080) 2.52  (0.001) 0.5  (0.021) 1.33  (-0.037) 0.020   
Diverse 2.51 (0.069) 6.36  (0.017) 9.22  (0.022) 13.74  (0.023) 0.027  
  100%  100%  100%  100%   
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Table 5: Managerial Turnover and Profit: Large1 
 OLS Fixed Effect 
  Director Turnover CEO Turnover Director Turnover CEO Turnover 


































































Adjusted R-square 0.17 0.08   
Number of observations 10936 9617 10936 9617 
P-value of F-test: Large1 State * Profit = Large1 Private* Profit 0.20 0.80 0.56 0.41 
P-value of F-test: Small1 State * Profit= Small1 Private * Profit 0.0001*** 0.39 0.003*** 0.60 
Note:  
1. Large or small indicates whether the company’s largest shareholder holds 50% or more shares. 
2. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported.  Both the director and CEO turnover estimations include the 
control for sales, industry and year dummies. The CEO turnover regression also includes CEO’s age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status.  
3. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Managerial Turnover and Profit: Large2 
 OLS Fixed Effect 
  Director Turnover CEO Turnover Director Turnover CEO Turnover 














































-0.059   
(0.046) 


















Adjusted R-square 0.17 0.08   
Number of observations 10936 9617 10936 9617 
P-value of F-test: Large1 State * Profit = Large1 Private* Profit 0.04** 0.35 0.65 0.26 
P-value of F-test: Small1 State * Profit= Small1 Private * Profit 0.0001*** 0.32 0.007*** 0.50 
Note:  
1. Large or small indicates whether the company’s largest shareholder holds 33% or more shares. 
2. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported.  Both the director and CEO turnover estimations include the 
control for sales, industry and year dummies. The CEO turnover regression also includes CEO’s age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status.  
3. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 7: Managerial Turnover and Profit: Large3 
 OLS Fixed Effect 
  Director Turnover CEO Turnover Director 
Turnover 
CEO Turnover 
































Large3 Private * Pre-tax profit- Lag1  -0.022***  
(0.007) 




-0.067   
(0.051) 








Small3 Private Ownership* Pre-tax profit- Lag1  -0.069***  
(0.013) 














  0.240*** 
(0.069) 
Adjusted R-square 0.17 0.08   
Number of observations 10936 9617 10936 9617 
P-value of F-test: Large1 State * Profit = Large1 Private* Profit 0.01***  0.06* 0.83  0.38 
P-value of F-test: Small1 State * Profit= Small1 Private * Profit 0.0001*** 0.31 0.0002***   0.03** 
Note:  
1. Large or small indicates whether the company’s largest shareholder holds 25% or more shares. 
2. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported.  Both the director and CEO turnover estimations include the 
control for sales, industry and year dummies. The CEO turnover regression also includes CEO’s age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status.  
3. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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 Table 8: Managerial Turnover and Profit: Share Percentage 
 OLS Fixed Effect 







Pre-tax Profit- lag 1 -0.003  
(0.011) 






State Share Percentage1  -0.048**  
(0.021) 




























-0.143   
(0.214) 












































Adjusted R-square 0.18 0.08   
Number of observations 10936 9617 10936 9617 
Note:  
1. State share percentage equals the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder when it is the state. Private share percentage equals the percentage of shares held by the largest owner when it is private. 
2. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported. Both the director and CEO turnover estimations include the control for sales, industry and year 
dummies. The CEO turnover regression also includes CEO’s age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status.  
3. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table A1: Managerial Turnover and Profit: Large1 and State_a 
 OLS Fixed Effect 
  Director Turnover CEO Turnover Director Turnover CEO Turnover 


































































Adjusted R-square 0.17 0.08   
Number of observations 10936 9617 10936 9617 
Note:  
1. Large or small indicates whether the company’s largest shareholder holds 50% or more shares.  
2. State_a or private_a indicates whether the company has any state shares. If the total percentages of state shares are greater than zero, state_a=1, otherwise state_a=0; 
3. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported.  Both the director and CEO turnover estimations include the 
control for sales, industry and year dummies. The CEO turnover regression also includes CEO’s age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status.  
4. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table A2: Managerial Turnover and Profit: Large2 and state_a 
 OLS Fixed Effect 
  Director Turnover CEO Turnover Director Turnover CEO Turnover 
















Small2 State_a Ownership 0.003 
(0.003) 






















Small2 State_a * Pre-tax Profit_ lag 1 -0.004  
(0.008) 




-0.065   
(0.043) 












  0.381*** 
(0.035) 




Adjusted R-square 0.17 0.08   
Number of observations 10936 9617 10936 9617 
Note:  
1. Large or small indicates whether the company’s largest shareholder holds 33% or more shares.  
2. State_a or private_a indicates whether the company has any state shares. If the total percentages of state shares are greater than zero, state_a=1, otherwise state_a=0; 
3. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported.  Both the director and CEO turnover estimations include the 
control for sales, industry and year dummies. The CEO turnover regression also includes CEO’s age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status.  
4. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix Table A3: Managerial Turnover and Profit: Large3 and state_a 
 OLS Fixed Effect 
  Director Turnover CEO Turnover Director 
Turnover 
CEO Turnover 
















Small3 State_a Ownership 0.003 
(0.005) 
 -0.042**  
(0.021) 












Large3 Private_a * Pre-tax Profit_ lag 1  -0.023**  
(0.010) 
 -0.114**   
(0.055) 
 -0.035***  
(0.014) 
-0.099*   
(0.053) 
Small3 State_a * Pre-tax Profit_ lag 1 0.004  
(0.008) 






Small3 Private_a * Pre-tax Profit_ lag 1  -0.075***  
(0.016) 














  0.223*** 
(0.070) 
Adjusted R-square 0.17 0.08   
Number of observations 10936 9617 10936 9617 
Note:  
1. Large or small indicates whether the company’s largest shareholder holds 25% or more shares.  
2. State_a or private_a indicates whether the company has any state shares. If the total percentages of state shares are greater than zero, state_a=1, otherwise state_a=0; 
3. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported.  Both the director and CEO turnover estimations include the 
control for sales, industry and year dummies. The CEO turnover regression also includes CEO’s age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status.  
4. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Figure 1:  Classification of Four Groups of Companies 
 
 Concentration 
 Large Small 














1. Large1 or small1 indicates whether the company has a large shareholder holding 50% or more shares. 
2. State or private indicates whether the largest shareholder is the state or private. 
3. The number indicates the percentage of companies switching between groups. 
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